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Reassigning Cases on Remand in the 
Interests of Justice, for the Enforcement 
of Appellate Decisions, and for Other 
Reasons That Remain Unclear 
JONATHAN D. COLAN* 
Federal appellate courts have the authority to order re-
assignment of cases to different district judges as part of 
their supervisory authority over the district courts within 
their circuits. This Article examines the categories of cases 
in which the Eleventh Circuit has ordered reassignment to 
different district court judges on remand and explains the 
rationale underlying reassignment in each category. The 
more understandable cases address both the appearance 
and the presence of bias or impropriety by the original trial 
judge. This Article describes the general principles underly-
ing the Eleventh Circuit’s reassignment practices and then 
questions why reassignment is necessary in cases involving 
government breaches of plea agreements where none of the 
usual reasons underlying reassignment seem to exist. 
In United States v. Torkington, the Eleventh Circuit ex-
tended the principle underlying reassignment beyond cases 
involving an erroneous refusal of the trial judge to recuse 
himself or herself. While the Torkington test addresses prob-
lems regarding the original trial judge’s bias, appearance of 
bias, recalcitrance, or mis-steps, there is an interesting de-
viation from these bases for reassignment in cases involving 
                                                                                                             
 *  Jonathan D. Colan is an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Appellate Division 
of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida and an 
Adjunct Professor of Appellate Law at the University of Miami School of Law. 
The opinions expressed herein are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views 
of the United States Attorney’s Office, the Department of Justice, or the Univer-
sity of Miami School of Law, or anyone else 
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breached plea agreements. Relying on the United States Su-
preme Court’s decision in Santobello v. New York, the Elev-
enth Circuit holds that the available remedies in a case 
where the prosecution breaches a plea agreement by making 
sentencing arguments or recommendations it promised not 
to make are either for the defendant to be allowed to with-
draw his guilty plea or for the case to be remanded for re-
sentencing by a different judge. The Eleventh Circuit rea-
soned that the trial judge who heard the prosecutor’s im-
proper sentencing argument cannot un-hear that argument 
when the case is remanded for resentencing. Yet, trial judges 
(and even lay jurors) are routinely presumed to be able to 
disregard improper evidence and arguments. 
The rationale for reassignment in breached plea agree-
ment cases remains curiously unexplored and seemingly at 
odds with the rationales underlying reassignment in other 
scenarios. This Article suggests that the Eleventh Circuit 
may wish to consider formalizing its reassignment practices 
and criteria by local rule. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In addition to the power to “affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or 
reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought 
before it for review,” a federal appellate court’s power also includes 
the authority to “remand the cause and direct the entry of such ap-
propriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further pro-
ceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.”1 Once 
it issues its decision in a case, the “findings of fact and conclusions 
of law by an appellate court are generally binding in all subsequent 
proceedings in the same case.”2 If the appellate court’s ruling is 
binding on the trial court and the appellate court can remand a case 
and direct the trial court to conduct such further proceedings as the 
appellate court deems appropriate, one could be forgiven for assum-
ing that any case so remanded would necessarily continue in accord-
ance with the appellate court’s instructions. This must be a faulty 
assumption, however, because federal appellate courts sometimes 
include in their remand instructions orders directing that cases be 
reassigned to different trial court judges than the ones who originally 
handled the cases.3 
Federal appellate courts have the authority to order reassignment 
of cases to different district judges as part of their supervisory au-
thority over the district courts within their circuits.4 “No federal stat-
ute or Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure addresses to which trial 
court judge a case should go following an appellate reversal . . . .”5 
The Eleventh Circuit has cited as the source of its reassignment au-
thority its powers under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (which include the power 
to “require such further proceedings [in the lower courts] as may be 
                                                                                                             
 1 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2012). 
 2 Burger King Corp. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 15 F.3d 166, 169 (11th Cir. 
1994) (citations omitted). 
 3 See discussion infra Sections II–IV. 
 4 Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. (Clark III), 990 F.2d 1217, 1229 (11th Cir. 
1993) (recognizing that power in civil cases); United States v. Torkington 
(Torkington II), 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that power in criminal cases). 
 5 Toby J. Heytens, Reassignment, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014). Only the 
Seventh Circuit has codified its reassignment practices in a local court rule. See 
id. at 11. 
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just under the circumstances”)6 and the Supreme Court’s example 
of ordering reassignment in Offutt v. United States.7 In Offutt, a case 
where “the trial judge permitted himself to become personally em-
broiled with the petitioner,” the Supreme Court stated “that applica-
tion of the rule pronounced in Cooke v. United States is called for,” 
and it “invite[d] the Chief Judge of the District Court to assign an-
other judge to sit in the second hearing of the charge against the 
petitioner.”8 Previously, in Cooke, the Supreme Court had merely 
noted that under appropriate circumstances, a trial judge him or her-
self “may, without flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of 
his fellow judges take his place.”9 This Article will show that reas-
signment is one method that appellate courts use both to preserve 
the presence and appearance of impartial justice and to maintain au-
thority over the implementation of their decisions in the trial 
courts.10 “Every federal circuit asserts a power to order reassign-
ment, and they have exercised that power in pretty much every type 
of case imaginable.”11 
This is not a power, however, that the Eleventh Circuit exercises 
“lightly.”12 There “are large variations in reassignment numbers,” 
among the various federal appellate circuits, “as well as in the types 
of cases in which reassignment is ordered, the procedures by which 
various circuits go about ordering it, and the reasons they give for 
doing so.”13 Professor Toby Heytens surveyed 668 unique federal 
appellate cases ordering reassignment between 1958 and 2012, and 
broke down the numbers of such cases by circuit.14 Although reas-
signment seems to be most utilized in the Seventh Circuit (an outlier 
circuit reflecting 324 reassignments—more than twice the number 
                                                                                                             
 6 See Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1446 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2106). 
 7 See id. (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17–18 (1954). 
 8 Offutt, 348 U.S. at 17–18 (quoting Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 
539 (1925)). 
 9 Cooke, 267 U.S. at 539. 
 10 See generally Heytens, supra note 5, at 34–42 (discussing the use of reas-
signment as a means of “appellate control” over the trial courts). 
 11 Id. at 6. 
 12 Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447. 
 13 Heytens, supra note 5, at 6. 
 14 See id. at 15–18. 
1096 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1092 
 
of the next circuit), the Eleventh Circuit had an above-average num-
ber of reassignments (28), compared to the median number (20) 
shown in the Fourth Circuit.15 
This Article will examine the categories of cases in which the 
Eleventh Circuit has ordered reassignment to different district court 
judges on remand and explain the rationale underlying reassignment 
in each category. The more understandable cases address both the 
appearance and the presence of bias or impropriety by the original 
trial judge.16 A more curious category of cases triggering reassign-
ment involves neither any apparent nor demonstrated bias or mis-
conduct by the trial judge.17 This Article will describe the general 
principles underlying the Eleventh Circuit’s reassignment practices 
in cases of bias or misconduct and then question why reassignment 
is necessary in cases involving government breaches of plea agree-
ments where none of the usual reasons underlying reassignment 
seem to exist. 
II. THE TORKINGTON TEST’S GENERAL RATIONALE FOR 
REASSIGNMENT 
The easy case for reassignment by the appellate court is when 
the error being raised on appeal is the trial judge’s failure to recuse 
himself or herself from involvement in a case. The federal recusal 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, provides: 
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the 
United States shall disqualify himself in any pro-
ceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned. 
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following 
circumstances: 
                                                                                                             
 15 Id. at 18 tbl.1. 
 16 See discussion infra Sections II–VI. 
 17 See infra Section VII. 
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(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of dis-
puted evidentiary facts concerning the proceed-
ing; 
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer 
in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with 
whom he previously practiced law served during 
such association as a lawyer concerning the mat-
ter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a mate-
rial witness concerning it; 
(3) Where he has served in governmental em-
ployment and in such capacity participated as 
counsel, adviser or material witness concerning 
the proceeding or expressed an opinion concern-
ing the merits of the particular case in contro-
versy; 
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduci-
ary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his 
household, has a financial interest in the subject 
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceed-
ing, or any other interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third 
degree of relationship to either of them, or the 
spouse of such a person: 
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, 
director, or trustee of a party; 
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest 
that could be substantially affected by the 
outcome of the proceeding; 
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(v) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a 
material witness in the proceeding.18 
As the court explained in United States v. Torkington (Torking-
ton II), “[i]f the trial judge should have recused himself and the case 
is remanded, it should be remanded with the direction that it be re-
assigned to a different district judge.”19 Interestingly, however, the 
case the court relied upon for that proposition, Parker v. Connors 
Steel Co., held that a trial judge’s error in failing to grant a recusal 
motion was subject to harmless error analysis,20 relying on the Su-
preme Court’s then recent decision in Liljeberg v. Health Services 
Acquisition Corp.21 Vacatur of the judgment and remand itself was 
not automatic, let alone reassignment to a different trial judge.22 
In Liljeberg, the Supreme Court held that “[a] conclusion that a 
[violation of the recusal statute] occurred does not . . . end our in-
quiry.”23 The Supreme Court explained that “[t]here need not be a 
draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a).”24 “As in other 
areas of the law, there is surely room for harmless error committed 
by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circum-
stance.”25 The Supreme Court noted, as an example of the sort of 
inadvertent recusal failure that should not necessarily result in re-
versal, cases involving “[l]arge, multidistrict class actions” where 
trial judges are presented with “unique difficulties in monitoring any 
potential interest they may have in the litigation.”26 In Liljeberg, 
however, while the Supreme Court accepted lower court findings 
that the original trial judge did not have “actual knowledge” of the 
interest of the university (on whose board he sat) in the case, while 
the case was being tried, he did learn of or should have learned of 
                                                                                                             
 18 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). 
 19 Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
 20 Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1525–26 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 21 Id. (citing Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 
(1988)). 
 22 See id. at 1526. 
 23 Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 862, 862 n.9. 
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facts prior to his entry of judgment that should have caused him to 
recuse himself.27 
The Supreme Court nevertheless recognized that while § 455 
“defines the circumstances that mandate disqualification of federal 
judges, it neither prescribes nor prohibits any particular remedy for 
a violation of that duty.”28 “Congress has wisely delegated to the 
judiciary the task of fashioning the remedies that will best serve the 
purpose of the legislation.”29 In deciding whether a judgment should 
be vacated and remanded for new proceedings based on the original 
judge’s failure to recuse him or herself, the Supreme Court in-
structed the appellate courts to consider “the risk of injustice to the 
parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will 
produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the 
public’s confidence in the judicial process.”30 The Eleventh Circuit 
continues to apply Liljeberg in cases reviewing the decision of the 
trial judge not to recuse him or herself.31 
In Torkington II, the Eleventh Circuit extended the principle un-
derlying reassignment in cases of an erroneous refusal of the trial 
judge to recuse himself or herself based on “circumstances existing 
prior to or at the time of the judge’s participation in a case” to cases 
involving “the judge’s own conduct during his participation in a 
case.”32 
Although the events that make it necessary to termi-
nate a judge’s participation in a case differ in the two 
situations, the reason the judge should not participate 
is the same: the judicial system has the obligation of 
preserving public confidence in the impartial and fair 
administration of justice.33 
                                                                                                             
 27 Id. at 865–68. 
 28 Id. at 862. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 863. 
 31 See, e.g., In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 865); Horne v. Horne, 630 F. App’x 908, 910 (11th Cir. 
2015) (citing Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 847). 
 32 Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (empha-
sis added). 
 33 Id. 
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Earlier, in United States v. White,34 the court had held that 
“where a reasonable person would question the trial judge’s impar-
tiality, reassignment is appropriate.”35 In Torkington II, the court 
stated that “[r]eassignment may be appropriate . . . if a judge con-
ducts a trial in a manner that creates the appearance that he is or may 
be unable to perform his role in an unbiased manner.”36 
The court did not limit reassignment to only cases involving 
demonstrated bias, however. The court listed “three elements” that 
it should consider to determine whether reassignment on remand 
was required even “where there is no indication of actual bias”: 
(1) whether the original judge would have difficulty 
putting his previous views and findings aside; (2) 
whether reassignment is appropriate to preserve the 
appearance of justice; (3) whether reassignment 
would entail waste and duplication out of proportion 
to gains realized from reassignment.37 
The Eleventh Circuit found these factors to be present in Torkington 
II.38 
The court examined the trial judge’s actions, and while expressly 
“not question[ing] the district judge’s actual ability, integrity, and 
impartiality,” the court nevertheless concluded that reassignment 
was necessary to “preserve not only the reality but also the appear-
ance of the proper functioning of the judiciary as a neutral, impartial 
administrator of justice.”39 The court noted that after it had previ-
ously reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment,40 the trial 
court on remand “dismissed the case at the first opportunity by con-
struing a motion for mistrial as a motion for entry of judgment of 
acquittal.”41 The court also noted that the trial judge had questioned 
“from the bench . . . the wisdom of the substantive law he had to 
                                                                                                             
 34 United States v. White, 846 F.2d 678 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 35 Id. at 695 (citing United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44, 47 (5th Cir. Unit 
B Aug. 1981)). 
 36 Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1446. 
 37 Id. at 1447. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See United States v. Torkington (Torkington I), 812 F.2d 1347, 1355 (11th 
Cir. 1987). 
 41 Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447. 
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apply and challenged the government’s decision to prosecute 
Torkington.”42 The trial judge had called the prosecution “‘silly[]’ 
and . . . a waste of the taxpayers’ money.”43 Addressing the first 
criterion weighing in favor of reassignment, the appellate court con-
cluded that the trial judge had “demonstrated great difficulty in put-
ting aside his prior conclusions about the merits of this prosecu-
tion.”44 The appellate court also determined that the second criterion 
was satisfied and that “reassignment is necessary to preserve the ap-
pearance of impartiality.”45 The third criterion “d[id] not work 
against reassignment in this case,” because it was “a simple case 
with which a different judge could quickly become familiar, and the 
district judge terminated the trial shortly after it began.”46 The court 
thus ordered that the case be remanded for further proceedings and 
reassigned to a different trial judge to “respond to the appearance of 
a lack of neutrality and . . . to preserve in the public mind the image 
of absolute impartiality and fairness of the judiciary.”47 
The “Torkington test” has become the standard in the Eleventh 
Circuit.48 As of the writing of this Article, it has been cited by name 
in more than two dozen subsequent cases.49 
III. REASSIGNMENT TO REMEDY THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS 
The Eleventh Circuit’s application of the Torkington test has led 
to reassignment in various cases involving an appearance of bias by 
the trial judge. Not long after Torkington II, in United States v. Tay-
lor,50 the court stated that its “review of the record in this case, and 
                                                                                                             
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See, e.g., United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1533 n.7 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(applying the so-dubbed “Torkington test”). 
 49 A Westlaw search on April 9, 2018, using the terms “Torkington /p reas-
sign!” resulted in 29 cases. Three other cases appear to use the language of the 
Torkington test while citing subsequent cases as supporting authority for the test. 
See, e.g., Stargel v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 791 F.3d 1309, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 
2015) (citing Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1373 (11th Cir. 
1997) as authority for the reassignment criteria). 
 50 United States v. Taylor, 972 F.2d 1247 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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the factors set forth by this circuit in [Torkington II], lead us to con-
clude that reassignment is appropriate.”51 The court explained that 
“statements made by the trial judge indicat[ed] a perceived predis-
position regarding sentencing.”52 
In Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.,53 the Eleventh Circuit de-
scribed at length the trial judge’s “utter failure” to manage the case 
through repeated discovery disputes, leading to the judge’s imposi-
tion of severe sanctions against the defendant corporation.54 After 
concluding that the district court abused its discretion in imposing 
the sanctions against Mazda, the appellate court considered Mazda’s 
“[u]nderstandabl[e]” request to have the case reassigned on re-
mand.55 The court recited the three-part Torkington test and ob-
served that “[w]hile the strong language employed in both the com-
pel order and the sanctions order suggest that the district judge may 
have trouble putting aside his previous views, we find the second 
factor the most telling.”56 The court cited not only the “[t]he extent 
of the judge’s abuse of discretion,” but also “the partiality of the 
practices constituting that abuse [that] would have a significant ef-
fect on the appearance of justice should he remain assigned to this 
case.”57 The court noted that “the judge’s practice of delegating the 
task of drafting sensitive, dispositive orders to plaintiffs’ counsel, 
and then uncritically adopting his proposed orders nearly verbatim, 
would belie the appearance of justice to the average observer.”58 As 
to the final Torkington factor, the court stated that “although signif-
icant time has already been spent on this case under his direction, 
the judge’s failure to manage the case removes any concerns involv-
ing waste or duplication.”59 The court had “confidence that a new 
judge who properly manages this case will need little time to ‘get up 
to speed’” and that “[t]he gains to be realized from reassignment will 
far outweigh the costs.”60 
                                                                                                             
 51 Id. at 1252 (citing Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1353. 
 54 See id. at 1358–64, 1371–72. 
 55 Id. at 1373. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 1374. 
 60 Id. 
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As of this Article’s writing, the Eleventh Circuit’s most recent 
published decision applying Torkington II is United States v. 
Plate.61 In Plate, at the defendant’s first sentencing hearing, the dis-
trict judge had conditioned his decision to impose a prison term, in-
stead of probation, on the defendant’s failure up to that time to pay 
sufficient restitution to her victims.62 Contrary to his actual author-
ity, the trial judge promised to convert her sentence when, and if, 
she paid restitution.63 When the appellate court initially remanded 
the case for the sole purpose of having the trial judge issue an order 
explaining the basis for his original rulings, the trial judge again 
cited the “substantial outstanding restitution Plate had yet to repay” 
and described her appeal as “frivolous.”64 When the case came back 
to the Eleventh Circuit, the appellate court vacated the district 
court’s erroneous judgment and remanded the matter for resentenc-
ing.65 The appellate court determined that reassignment to a new 
trial judge was necessary “[b]ecause the district judge confirmed 
and reiterated his consideration of Plate’s inability to pay restitution 
as a factor in his order on remand . . . [and] stated [his] belief that 
Plate’s arguments on appeal were ‘frivolous,’ even after having the 
benefit of reviewing those arguments.”66 These circumstances led 
the appellate court to conclude, under Torkington II, that “the district 
court may be unable to disregard its improper consideration of [the 
defendant’s restitution payments] or, at least, that it may appear 
so.”67 
                                                                                                             
 61 United States v. Plate, 839 F.3d 950, 958 (11th Cir. 2016). The Eleventh 
Circuit has recently issued an unpublished decision, applying Torkington II, or-
dering reassignment in a case where the district judge had announced that not-
withstanding any errors in his sentencing guideline calculations, he would still 
have imposed an “identical” sentence “as a reasonable sentence.” United States v. 
Killen, __ F.App’x __, 2018 WL 1560050, *11 (11th Cir. March 29, 2018) (un-
published). 
 62 Id. at 954–55. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 955. 
 65 Id. at 958. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. (citing Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446–47 (11th Cir. 1989) (per 
curiam)). 
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IV. DENYING REASSIGNMENT WHERE THE APPELLATE COURT 
RETAINS CONFIDENCE IN THE TRIAL JUDGE 
This same analysis has led the court to deny requests that cases 
be reassigned when the Torkington factors weighed against it. In Si-
erra Club v. Van Antwerp,68 the court vacated the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff environmental 
groups challenging the Army Corps of Engineers’ grant of mining 
permits and “remand[ed] [the] case to the district court to apply the 
proper [Administrative Procedure Act] standard of review to the 
Corps’s environmental analysis.”69 The appellate court stated, how-
ever, that despite the mining companies’ request for reassignment of 
the case to a different judge, it had “no reason to believe that the 
well-respected district judge to whom this case is assigned will not 
be able to apply the proper standard of review on remand.”70 Apply-
ing Torkington II, the court reasoned that “reassignment would en-
tail substantial waste and duplication because another judge would 
need to become familiar with the massive record.”71 
In United States v. Shaygan,72 after concluding that the trial 
judge violated the due process rights of two attorneys he publicly 
reprimanded for their actions in the case, the court remanded the 
case for further proceedings but expressed confidence in the trial 
judge’s continued handling of the case.73 While it acknowledged 
that it might be “unreasonable” to expect a trial judge to put aside 
his previous views in cases involving multiple appeals and remands, 
the court believed that, in the case before it, the trial judge was ca-
pable of doing so in the circumstance of a first remand.74 Moreover, 
weighing the Torkington factors, the appellate court concluded that 
“reassignment [was] unnecessary to preserve the appearance of jus-
tice and would require undue duplication of effort.”75 
Despite its explanation in Shaygan that a trial judge might lose 
the confidence of the appellate court after multiple remands, the 
                                                                                                             
 68 Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 69 Id. at 1356. 
 70 Id. at 1364 n.9. 
 71 Id. 
 72 United States v. Shaygan, 652 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 73 Id. at 1318–19. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 1318–19. 
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Eleventh Circuit refused to order reassignment on remand in Sover-
eign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of 
Rhodes & of Malta v. Florida Priory of the Knights Hospitallers of 
the Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem (Sovereign Military 
Hospital Order II),76 even after having earlier refused to reassign the 
case after a previous appeal.77 Although the court reiterated that 
“[r]eassignment can become warranted on the second or third ap-
peal, even [when] it was not warranted on the first or second ap-
peal,” it did not fault the district court for its handling of the case 
after the previous appeal.78 The court accepted that “[t]he district 
court could have read our earlier decision—mistakenly, but reason-
ably.”79 The court explained that while it agreed that “the district 
judge’s adherence to his previous finding of fraud and his continued 
reliance on [disputed] testimony suggest he may have difficulty put-
ting his previous views and findings aside . . . , his most recent mis-
steps seem more akin to garden-variety errors of law than the kind 
of direct defiance or stalemated posture that requires reassign-
ment.”80 The appellate court acknowledged, however, that “the dis-
trict judge’s repeated impugning of the parties’ motives in written 
opinions and public hearings [was] cause for concern.”81 Neverthe-
less, the court saw “no evidence that his remarks played any role in 
his ultimate decision,” and it was “still convinced that reassignment 
[would] entail waste and duplication out of proportion to the 
gains.”82 Because the trial judge had “a unique familiarity with this 
complex, fact-intensive case,” the court denied reassignment and ex-
pressed its continued “expectation” that, “on remand, both parties 
will be treated with the respect they deserve and that the district 
                                                                                                             
 76 Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes 
& of Malta v. Fla. Priory of the Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of 
Saint John of Jerusalem (Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order II), 809 F.3d 1171, 
1193–94 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 77 Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes 
& of Malta v. Fla. Priory of the Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of 
Saint John of Jerusalem (Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order I), 702 F.3d 1279, 
1297 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 78 Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order II, 809 F.3d at 1193–94. 
 79 Id. at 1194. 
 80 Id. at 1193 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 81 Id. at 1194. 
 82 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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court will be able to freshly consider the remanded claims notwith-
standing its previously expressed views,” as the court had similarly 
instructed after the first appeal.83 
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Torkington II in Cooper 
v. United States, where the court denied the defendant’s request for 
reassignment to a different judge on remand.84 Although the trial 
judge had “entered an order that was contrary to the parties’ agree-
ment and to their stipulated facts,” the court noted that “this is the 
first appeal on Cooper’s motion to vacate,” referring to its rationale 
in Shaygan, “and we normally expect the district court to put his 
previous views and findings aside on remand.”85 
V. REASSIGNING CASES FROM JUDGES WHO REFUSE TO CARRY 
OUT THE APPELLATE COURT’S INSTRUCTIONS 
Despite the court’s confidence that district judges will abide by 
its instructions on remand,86 the Eleventh Circuit has ordered cases 
reassigned on remand in circumstances where the district judges 
failed or refused to carry out the appellate court’s instructions.87 
In Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. (Clark III),88 the Eleventh Circuit 
reassigned the case to be heard by a different trial judge after it va-
cated the trial judge’s third rejection of the plaintiffs’ claims in 
whole or in part.89 The plaintiffs had not sought reassignment after 
their first appeal (Clark I), when the appellate court reinstated some 
of their dismissed claims.90 When they subsequently appealed the 
                                                                                                             
 83 Id. (quoting Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order I, 702 F.3d at 1297). 
 84 Cooper v. United States, 660 F. App’x 730, 737 (11th Cir. 2016) (per cu-
riam). 
 85 Id. (citing United States v. Shaygan, 652 F.3d 1297, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 
2011)). 
 86 E.g., Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom., 771 F.3d 713, 
735 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that its “remand includes specific instructions that 
give the district court little discretion,” and expressing its “confiden[ce] that [the 
trial judge] will be fair and just”). 
 87 See, e.g., Clark III, 990 F.2d 1217, 1229–30 (11th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Remillong (Remillong III), 55 F.3d 572, 577 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Martin (Martin II), 455 F.3d 1227, 1242 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 88 Clark III, 990 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 89 Id. at 1229–31. 
 90 Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. (Clark I), 865 F.2d 1237, 1245 (11th Cir. 
1989). 
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trial judge’s grant of summary judgment against their claims on re-
mand (Clark II),91 the plaintiffs attached to their appellate brief an 
affidavit from a law professor, who had conducted a statistical anal-
ysis of the trial judge’s rulings, purporting to demonstrate a bias 
against certain civil rights claimants.92 Although the appellate court 
recognized its authority to reassign the case under Torkington II,93 
it could not consider information outside the record on appeal.94 Ab-
sent the affidavit, the appellate court explained that “the plaintiffs 
are left with nothing upon which to base their argument for reassign-
ment.”95 When the case was remanded a second time for further con-
sideration of the plaintiffs’ claims, the trial judge’s order granting 
summary judgment against the plaintiffs’ claims again “contained 
strong language expressing dissatisfaction with [the appellate] 
court’s decision.”96 The appellate court concluded that, “in the lan-
guage of Torkington [II], ‘the original judge would have difficulty 
putting his previous views and findings aside,’” and ordered the case 
reassigned on remand.97 
Similarly, in United States v. Remillong (Remillong III),98 the 
court ordered the case reassigned after the trial judge twice resisted 
the appellate court’s instructions.99 In the first appeal,100 the appel-
late court ruled that the trial judge had “clearly erred in [both] find-
ing that the defendant made an express death threat,” in the commis-
sion of a bank robbery, and by enhancing the defendant’s sentence 
on the basis of this error.101 In Remillong III, the appellate court 
noted that in the first resentencing remand, the trial judge “deleted 
the two-level, express-threat-of-death enhancement in accordance 
                                                                                                             
 91 Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. (Clark II), 929 F.2d 604, 606 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 92 Id. at 609. 
 93 Id. at 609 n.10 (citing Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(per curiam). 
 94 Id. at 609–10. 
 95 Id. at 610. 
 96 Clark III, 990 F.2d 1217, 1229 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 97 Id. at 1230 (citing Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447). 
 98 Remillong III, 55 F.3d 572 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 99 Id. at 577. 
 100 United States v. Canzater (Remillong I), 994 F.2d 773, 774 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(deciding a consolidated appeal with Remillong’s co-defendant Darryl L. Can-
zater). 
 101 Id. at 775. 
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with this court’s mandate . . . but then enhanced Remillong’s sen-
tence by three levels . . . for the possession of a dangerous weapon 
during the bank robberies, when no weapon was involved.”102 The 
appellate court considered the trial judge’s enhancement during the 
resentencing remand to be an “attempt to circumvent [the] court’s 
direction in [Remillong I], where [it] explained that ‘[t]he statement, 
“I have a gun”’ may only be a bald threat, which does not mean 
necessarily that a gun was present during the commission of the rob-
bery.”103 In Remillong’s second appeal (Remillong II),104 the Elev-
enth Circuit vacated his sentence and a restitution order, and it or-
dered the trial judge to resentence Remillong without the enhance-
ment—in accordance with its ruling in Remillong I—and to re-ex-
amine the restitution order with a consideration for Remillong’s 
ability to pay.105 In the third appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that 
it had previously “explicitly explained” to the trial judge that a de-
fendant’s financial condition and ability to pay “must be fully con-
sidered,” in accordance with the relevant restitution statute.106 In the 
ensuing second remand for resentencing, the trial judge “however, 
refused to eliminate the restitution order,” and “[i]nstead, . . . hand-
wrote across the top of Remillong’s motion to correct his sentence: 
‘Because this case involves a bank robbery and defendant had phys-
ical possession of the money, restitution of $29,251.00 is appropri-
ate.’”107 In Remillong’s third appeal, the Eleventh Circuit stated: 
“After specifically being instructed by this court in Remillong II to 
assess on remand Remillong’s financial capability to pay restitution 
pursuant to section 3664(a), [the trial judge’s] cryptic handwritten 
notation that Remillong owes full restitution because he once had 
physical possession of the money is more than irresponsible, it is 
defiant.”108 
                                                                                                             
 102 Remillong III, 55 F.3d at 573 n.1. 
 103 Id. (quoting Remillong I, 994 F.2d at 775). 
 104 United States v. Remillong (Remillong II), 20 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(unpublished memorandum decision). 
 105 See Remillong III, 55 F.3d at 573 n.1. 
 106 Id. at 573–74 (quoting Remillong II, No. 93-3034, slip op. at 3–4 (11th Cir. 
April 12, 1994) (quoting 18 U.S.C § 3664(a) (1996)). 
 107 Id. at 574. 
 108 Id. at 576. 
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This time, the court held that reassignment to a new judge was 
necessary on remand.109 The court stated that the trial judge’s be-
havior in this case was “not an aberration.”110 It noted that it had 
“previously . . . reversed and/or remanded cases to [the judge] for 
failing to provide factual and legal explanations for his rulings.”111 
It recounted the time it “gently chided [the judge] for his failure to 
provide reasoning for dismissing a claim,”112 the occasion it was 
forced to employ “the severe remedy of reassigning a case when [the 
judge] abused his discretion by refusing to grant an evidentiary hear-
ing,”113 and its previous need to “specifically . . . address[]” the 
problem with the judge’s “handwritten notations . . . failing to give 
reasons for dispositive orders.”114 The court stated that it was 
“greatly troubled that [this judge] continue[d] to ignore or to circum-
vent specific directives and mandates from this court in his adjudi-
cation of cases before him.”115 The fact that this was the third appeal 
resulting from the trial judge’s actions “exemplifie[d] the judicial 
inefficiency that results from such obstinate conduct.”116 The court 
resolved that “the only way . . . [to] obtain compliance” from this 
trial judge was to “reverse or vacate his rulings outright with the 
instruction that he cannot rule a particular way,” because when al-
lowed “the opportunity to exercise discretion,” he “stubbornly per-
sisted” in his erroneous behavior.117 
Yet, despite noting its power to remand the case with explicit 
instructions, leaving the trial judge without discretion to deviate, the 
court decided that reassignment was necessary.118 Because of the 
                                                                                                             
 109 Id. at 577. 
 110 Id. at 576. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 577 (citing Grant v. County of Seminole, 817 F.2d 731, 732 (11th 
Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). 
 113 Id. (citing United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992)). 
 114 Id. (citing Seamon v. Vaughan, 921 F.2d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 1991) (per 
curiam)). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
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“two prior remands in this case,” the appellate court had “no confi-
dence that [the trial judge would] perform the appropriate evalua-
tion” on remand.119 
Sometimes, however, the line between straight-out defying the 
appellate court’s instructions and simply adhering to previous views 
is a fine one. In United States v. Martin (Martin II),120 the district 
court had originally sentenced a corporate executive, who had pled 
guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud and mail fraud and 
to falsifying books and records, to serve a term only of 60 months’ 
probation.121 His calculated guideline sentencing range was 108 to 
135 months’ imprisonment, and the government had requested a 
sentence of 62 months’ imprisonment.122 In Martin’s first appeal, 
the Eleventh Circuit noted the trial judge’s “broad discretion in de-
termining the extent of a downward departure,” but it held that the 
trial court hadfailed to offer sufficient reasons for its sentence on the 
record to allow “meaningful appellate review.”123 The court in-
structed that a sentencing judge “must, at a minimum, give some 
indication of the [U.S.S.G.] § 5K1.1 factors upon which it relies and 
the reasons for the extent of the departure.”124 The court then re-
manded the case to the trial judge “for resentencing consistent with 
this opinion.”125 At the remanded resentencing hearing, the govern-
ment asked the district court to balance Martin’s cooperation with 
the seriousness of his offense.126 It ultimately requested a 42-month 
imprisonment term, representing “a reduction in excess of 60 per-
cent from the low end of Martin’s pre-departure 108–135-month 
guideline range.”127 The trial judge, however, granted an even more 
significant departure, resulting in a guideline imprisonment range of 
zero to six months, and then imposed a sentence of seven days’ im-
prisonment.128 
                                                                                                             
 119 Id. 
 120 Martin II, 455 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 121 Id. at 1231–32; United States v. Martin (Martin I), 135 F. App’x 411, 411–
12 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 122 Martin II, 455 F.3d at 1229–30, 1232; Martin I, 135 F. App’x at 411–12. 
 123 Martin I, 135 F. App’x at 415–16. 
 124 Id. at 415. 
 125 Id. at 416. 
 126 Martin II, 455 F.3d at 1233. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
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On appeal back to the Eleventh Circuit, the court took pains to 
note that this was “the second appeal in Martin’s case and the second 
time we have had to reverse the sentence.”129 The court’s opinion in 
Martin II spells out the appellate court’s problems with the approach 
taken by the district court in applying the relevant sentencing fac-
tors.130 Importantly, for this Article’s purposes, the appellate court 
emphasized that “Martin’s crimes and the district court’s punish-
ment are so wildly disproportionate that we readily conclude that the 
district court’s 7–day sentence is . . . unreasonable and must be va-
cated . . . for the second time.”131 The court concluded: 
In light of the two reversals in this case and three 
other appeals in which we have reversed the same 
judge for extraordinary downward departures that 
were without a valid basis in the record, we find it 
likely that “the original judge would have difficulty 
putting his previous views and findings aside.”132 
Interestingly—despite the court’s “settled practice” of remand-
ing with instructions for the chief judge of the district to reassign the 
case to a new judge—because the original judge in Martin was him-
self the chief judge of the district, the appellate court had to instruct 
that the case be “reassigned by the most senior active judge” of the 
district.133 
In United States v. Gupta (Gupta III),134  the court dealt with the 
third appeal of the district court’s sentencing of the defendant and 
the government’s second request that the case be reassigned on re-
mand for resentencing.135 The government had filed the first appeal 
in this case after the district court, “some thirty-three months after 
denying” the defendants’ original post-trial motions, granted what 
were termed “motions to reconsider” or “renewed” motions for 
judgments of acquittal or a new trial, which were filed a year after 
                                                                                                             
 129 Id. at 1242. 
 130 See id. at 1237–42. 
 131 Id. at 1239. 
 132 Id. at 1242 (quoting Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(per curiam)). 
 133 Id. 
 134 United States v. Gupta (Gupta III), 572 F.3d 878 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 135 See id. at 880–81. 
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the denial of their original motions.136 In Gupta I, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit vacated the district court’s order because the district court 
“plainly lacked jurisdiction to entertain these post-verdict motions,” 
but it denied the government’s reassignment request, stating that it 
saw no appearance of bias against the government from a judge who 
had denied the defendant’s original post-trial motions.137 As to the 
government’s fear that the judge would adhere to the light sentence 
he had suggested he was considering at an earlier sentencing hear-
ing, the appellate court remarked that “it seems strange to claim that 
the trial judge is likely to rule in an ominously predictable manner 
when he has already demonstrated his willingness to reconsider his 
previous rulings.”138 
Yet, in Gupta II,139 the appellate court affirmed the defendants’ 
convictions but vacated their sentences in a government cross-ap-
peal, holding that the district court had misapplied the federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines when the case was remanded for resentencing.140 
The appellate court noted the trial judge’s statement during sentenc-
ing proceedings that while “it may be that the [Eleventh] Circuit will 
decide that a crime has been committed[,] . . . it’s amazing to me 
that somebody could be convicted of a felony based upon a bureau-
cratic regulation.”141 The appellate court then held that the trial 
judge had clearly erred both in denying a role enhancement and in 
calculating the amount of loss while determining the defendant’s 
guideline sentencing range.142 The Eleventh Circuit vacated the de-
fendants’ sentences of three years’ probation and remanded the case 
for resentencing.143 On remand, the district court “reiterated its be-
lief that Gupta’s criminal activity had been overstated,” and re-im-
posed its previous sentence of three years’ probation.144 
In the third appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the defendants’ 
sentences again, and this time it ordered that the case be reassigned 
                                                                                                             
 136 See United States v. Gupta (Gupta I), 363 F.3d 1169, 1172 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 137 Id. at 1170, 1177. 
 138 Id. at 1177. 
 139 United States v. Gupta (Gupta II), 463 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 140 Id. at 1186. 
 141 Id. at 1197. 
 142 Id. at 1198–1200. 
 143 Id. at 1200. 
 144 Gupta III, 572 F.3d 878, 886–87 (11th Cir. 2009). 
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to a new judge for resentencing on remand.145 The various proce-
dural errors the appellate court concluded the trial judge had made146 
are less important to this Article than the appellate court’s descrip-
tion of the trial judge’s approach as “arbitrary.”147 The court ob-
served (regarding some of the district court’s calculations): “The er-
ror of the district court is not limited to its failure to make findings 
about these key issues. The cursory statements of the district court 
suggest that the district court made no findings about anything at 
all.”148 This rendered “meaningful appellate review [of these issues] 
impossible.”149 The appellate court noted that other sentencing de-
terminations simply had no support in the record.150 
Ultimately, in this third appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded 
that reassignment was necessary “because ‘the trial judge has 
demonstrated great difficulty in putting aside his prior conclusions 
about the merits of this prosecution.’”151 While expressly stating that 
it did “not question the district judge’s actual ability, integrity and 
impartiality,”152 the appellate court explained: 
At the third sentencing hearing, the district court ad-
hered to its erroneous belief that Gupta’s behavior 
was not criminal, emphasized that other federal pros-
ecutors had declined to prosecute Gupta, disparaged 
the merits of his prosecution, and committed two 
basic procedural errors in the most recent proceed-
ings. The error of reducing Gupta’s sentence for ac-
ceptance of responsibility was obvious and gratui-
tous, and we had warned the district court about fail-
ing to make a calculation of actual or intended 
loss.153 
                                                                                                             
 145 Id. at 881. 
 146 See id. at 888–891. 
 147 Id. at 889. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 890. 
 151 Id. at 892 (quoting Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(per curiam)). 
 152 Id. (quoting Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447). 
 153 Id. 
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The appellate court determined that “[a]lthough the district court 
acknowledged its obligation to follow our mandate, the district court 
failed to fulfill that obligation,” and it saw “no basis for a belief that 
the district court will employ a different approach if given another 
chance.”154 Applying the substance of the Torkington test, without 
so-describing it, the court determined that “[r]eassignment will not 
produce excessive duplication,” because of the extensive record and 
guidance built up over the case’s history in both the trial and appel-
late court, and that reassignment was “necessary to preserve the ap-
pearance of justice.”155 Significantly for its application to future 
cases, the Eleventh Circuit in Gupta III recognized: “The situation 
is qualitatively different now than it was in Gupta I or Gupta II. The 
refusal of the district court to set aside its feelings is more pro-
nounced after a third appeal and a second request for reassignment, 
and we see no basis for a belief that the district court will adjust its 
view if given another chance.”156 
VI. REASSIGNING CASES FROM JUDGES WHO HAVE HELPED TOO 
MUCH 
An appellate court’s supervisory authority over a trial court un-
derstandably includes the authority to alleviate a party’s concern 
about the trial court’s misbehavior. Yet, reassignments can occur 
even when a trial judge’s partiality or performance is called into 
question by seemingly helpful behavior. 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that 
“[a]n attorney for the government and the defendant’s attorney, or 
the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a plea 
agreement,” but “[t]he court must not participate in these discus-
sions.”157 Although the Supreme Court, in United States v. Davila 
(Davila II) has clarified that a trial judge’s violation of this rule does 
not “itself demand vacatur,” and that the violation itself is subject to 
harmless or plain error analysis,158 when such a violation does result 
                                                                                                             
 154 Id. 
 155 Id; see Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447 (describing the factors to be 
weighed before ordering reassignment on remand). 
 156 Gupta III, 572 F.3d at 892. 
 157 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
 158 United States v. Davila (Davila II), 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2148 (2013). 
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in a vacatur of the defendant’s guilty plea, the Eleventh Circuit will 
order that the case “be reassigned ‘as a means to extend the prophy-
lactic scheme established by Rule 11 and to prevent the possible 
misimpression created by the [district court’s] participation.’”159 
In United States v. Corbitt,160 the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the 
Former Fifth Circuit’s161 holding in United States v. Adams162 that 
the prophylactic purpose of Rule 11(c)(1) requires reassignment re-
gardless of any “belief as to the actual impartiality of the district 
court judge who heard this case, or as to the propriety of the sentence 
she rendered.”163 A prophylactic remedy was necessary “in order to 
protect defendants from the potential (but difficult to prove) effects 
of judicial participation in plea negotiations.”164 The court ex-
plained, in Corbitt, that Adams thus required reassignment “even if 
there is no evidence that the judge is vindictive or biased.”165 
In United States v. Casallas,166 the Eleventh Circuit emphasized 
that the triggering Rule 11 violation occurs even when “it is clear 
that the . . . judge . . . was motivated primarily by the concern that 
[the defendant] be thoroughly apprised of the situation that he 
faced.”167 The court had held, in Corbitt, that reassignment was re-
quired even in cases where the trial judge does “nothing flagrant,” 
but merely indicates that the defendant is likely to receive a heavy 
sentence and should think carefully about the prosecution’s offer.168 
                                                                                                             
 159 United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
United States v. Corbitt, 996 F.2d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). 
 160 Corbitt, 996 F.2d at 1132. 
 161 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en 
banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit 
handed down before October 1, 1981). See generally Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (splitting the 
former Fifth Circuit and creating the present Eleventh Circuit). 
 162 United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 835–36, 39 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 
1981), superseded by regulation, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUEL (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 1984), as recognized in United States v. Diaz, 138 F.3d 
1359 (1998). 
 163 Id. at 842; accord Corbitt, 996 F.2d at 1134–35. 
 164 Adams, 634 F.2d at 842–43. 
 165 Corbitt, 996 F.2d at 1135. 
 166 United States v. Casallas, 59 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 167 Id. at 1178. 
 168 Corbitt, 996 F.2d at 1135 (discussing the facts in United States v. Bruce, 
976 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
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In the Eleventh Circuit’s initial handling of Davila’s appeal, which 
relied on Casallas, it stated that vacatur of the plea, and the resulting 
reassignment of the case, was necessary even when the trial judge 
merely “contrasts the sentence a defendant would receive if he pled 
guilty with the sentence he would receive if he went to trial and was 
found guilty.”169 The trial judge’s motivations, “‘however well-in-
tentioned,’ will not excuse” the judge’s violation of Rule 11(c)(1).170 
Although, in Davila II, the Supreme Court overturned the Elev-
enth Circuit’s rule requiring automatic vacatur of a defendant’s plea 
without requiring a showing of prejudice, it did not disturb the au-
tomatic reassignment remedy in cases in which vacatur of the plea 
was necessary.171 In United States v. Harrell,172 the Eleventh Circuit 
recognized that the Supreme Court’s decision in Davila II meant that 
a defendant must show that the trial judge’s interference in the plea 
negotiations “affected his substantial rights, meaning that the entire 
record must bear out the conclusion that ‘it was reasonably probable 
that, but for the [district court’s] exhortations, [the defendant] would 
have exercised his right to go to trial.’”173 The Eleventh Circuit had 
no difficulty finding that Mr. Harrell had met that burden.174 The 
court vacated Harrell’s conviction and remanded the case to allow 
him to withdraw his guilty plea.175 Its remedial doctrine nevertheless 
intact, the court also “direct[ed] that the case be reassigned ‘as a 
means to extend the prophylactic scheme established by Rule 11 and 
to prevent the possible misimpression created by the [district 
court’s] participation.’”176 
                                                                                                             
 169 United States v. Davila (Davila I), 664 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(citing the holding of Casallas, 59 F.3d at 1177). 
 170 Id. at 1359 (quoting Casallas, 59 F.3d at 1178). 
 171 See Davila II, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2143 (2013); United States v. Castro, 736 
F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that “the Supreme Court abrogated 
our rule of automatic vacatur”). 
 172 United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 173 Id. at 1240 (quoting Davila II, 133 S. Ct. at 2150). 
 174 See id. at 1240–41. 
 175 Id. at 1241. 
 176 Id. (quoting United States v. Corbitt, 996 F.2d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 
1993)). 
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VII. THE CURIOUS CATEGORY OF REASSIGNMENTS NOT 
TRIGGERED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE’S ACTIONS 
Each of the previous categories of cases in which the Eleventh 
Circuit will reassign a case away from the original trial judge in-
volves some action, comment, or circumstance regarding the trial 
judge him- or herself. The underlying rationale of the Torkington 
test and the cases in which the Eleventh Circuit reassigns proceed-
ings to new judges on remand address problems regarding the orig-
inal trial judge’s bias, appearance of bias, recalcitrance, or mis-
steps.177 There is, however, an interesting deviation from this ra-
tionale in cases where reassignment is not merely an option, but ac-
tually required. Tracing back to the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Santobello v. New York,178 the Eleventh Circuit holds 
that the available remedies in a case where the prosecution breaches 
a plea agreement, by making sentencing arguments or recommenda-
tions it promised not to make, are either for the defendant to be al-
lowed to withdraw his guilty plea or for the case to be remanded for 
“resentence[ing] by a different judge.”179 
In Santobello, the issue presented to the Supreme Court was 
“whether the State’s failure to keep a commitment concerning the 
sentence recommendation on a guilty plea required a new trial.”180 
As part of the plea negotiation, “[t]he prosecutor [had] agreed to 
make no recommendation as to the [defendant’s] sentence.”181 Var-
ious matters delayed sentencing in the case, until, by the time the 
matter came before the court for sentencing, “another prosecutor had 
replaced the prosecutor who had negotiated the plea,” and the “new 
prosecutor recommended the maximum one-year sentence.”182 De-
fense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s recommendation, citing 
the plea agreement.183 In imposing sentence, however, the trial judge 
assured the defendant that he was “not at all influenced by what the 
                                                                                                             
 177 See Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446–47 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); 
Clark II, 929 F.2d 604, 609 (11th Cir. 1991); see also 28 U.S.C. §455 (2012). 
 178 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971). 
 179 United States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1525 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting 
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263). 
 180 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 257–58. 
 181 Id. at 258. 
 182 Id. at 259. 
 183 Id. 
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District Attorney says,” adding that “[i]t doesn’t make a particle of 
difference what the District Attorney says.”184 The judge, instead, 
cited the probation report detailing the defendant’s “long, long seri-
ous criminal record” in imposing the maximum one-year sen-
tence.185 Given the prosecution’s breach of the plea agreement, in-
advertent or not, the Supreme Court explained that it “need not reach 
the question whether the sentencing judge would or would not have 
been influenced had he known all the details of the negotiations for 
the plea.”186 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the sentencing 
judge “stated that the prosecutor’s recommendation did not influ-
ence him and we have no reason to doubt that.”187  Regardless, 
“[t]hat the breach of the agreement was inadvertent does not lessen 
its impact.”188 
As to the appropriate remedy, without referencing any authority 
circumscribing the available options, the Supreme Court stated: 
The ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we 
leave to the discretion of the state court, which is in 
a better position to decide whether the circumstances 
of this case require only that there be specific perfor-
mance of the agreement on the plea, in which case 
petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge, 
or whether, in the view of the state court, the circum-
stances require granting the relief sought by peti-
tioner, i.e., the opportunity to withdraw his plea of 
guilty.189 
Even as it called into being the requirement that any resentenc-
ing be performed by a new judge, the Supreme Court “emphasize[d] 
that this is in no sense to question the fairness of the sentencing 
judge; the fault here rests on the prosecutor, not on the sentencing 
judge.”190 The Supreme Court offered no explanation, however, for 
                                                                                                             
 184 Id. (quoting the sentencing judge from the pre-sentence report). 
 185 Id. at 259–60. 
 186 Id. at 262. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 263 (emphasis added). 
 190 Id. 
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why resentencing would have to take place in front of a different 
judge. 
Within the Eleventh Circuit—or rather, given the era, the former 
Fifth Circuit191—the Supreme Court’s Santobello reassignment 
remedy was first applied in Johnson v. Beto.192 In explaining its or-
dered remedy, the Fifth Circuit stated that it “can do no better than 
quote the words of Santobello,” which it proceeded to do.193 The 
court offered no further rationale beyond the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing. 
The Fifth Circuit offered more of an explanation in United States 
v. Ewing,194 a case in which the court held that “Ewing is not entitled 
to have his plea set aside but must be given the opportunity to submit 
the same [sentencing] motion to a different judge.”195 The court ex-
plained that “[w]e do it this way ‘both for the judge’s sake and the 
appearance of justice,’” quoting the First Circuit’s application of 
Santobello in Mawson v. United States.196 In Mawson, the First Cir-
cuit had stated that the appearance of justice required reassignment, 
because “[i]t is difficult for a judge, having once made up his mind, 
to resentence a defendant.”197 
After the Fifth Circuit split,198 the new Eleventh Circuit first ap-
plied Santobello’s breached-plea-agreement holding in In re 
Arnett,199 a case in which the United States Attorney’s Office had 
sought forfeiture of property it had promised not to go after.200 Cit-
ing Santobello for the proposition that “[w]here the government has 
                                                                                                             
 191 See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-
452, § 10, 94 Stat. 1994, 1995. 
 192 Johnson v. Beto, 466 F.2d 478, 479–80 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 193 Id. (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263). 
 194 United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 195 Id. at 1143. In Santobello, of course, the Supreme Court directed that the 
lower courts decide from the circumstances whether the defendant should have 
“the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty.” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263 (“The 
ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we leave to the discretion of the 
[lower] court.”). 
 196 Ewing, 480 F.2d at 1143 (quoting Mawson v. United States, 463 F.2d 29, 
31 (1st Cir. 1972)). 
 197 Mawson, 463 F.2d at 31. 
 198 See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-
452, § 10, 94 Stat. 1994, 1995. 
 199 In re Arnett, 804 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 200 Id. at 1201–02, 1204. 
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not honored a plea agreement, the fashioning of an appropriate rem-
edy is left to the sound discretion of the court,” the Eleventh Circuit 
allowed the United States Attorney’s Office to “cure the breach of 
the plea bargain by withdrawing the forfeiture action.”201 In the 
event the government did not withdraw its forfeiture action, the dis-
trict court was directed “to grant Arnett’s motion to vacate his 
plea.”202 Because resentencing was not at issue, the appellate court 
did not address the issue of reassigning the matter to a new judge for 
further proceedings. 
The Eleventh Circuit first applied Santobello’s reassignment 
remedy in United States v. Nelson.203 Discussing Santobello and 
noting its discretion to opt between the available remedies, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that the defendants should not be allowed to with-
draw their guilty pleas, and instead “deem[ed] specific performance 
to be the appropriate remedy.”204 Without further elaboration on 
Santobello, the Eleventh Circuit held “that appellants are entitled to 
specific performance of their respective plea agreements before a 
different sentencing judge,” relying on Fifth Circuit precedent.205 In 
one of those Fifth Circuit cases, the court noted that an “unfortunate 
problem which cannot help but arise when considering [a defend-
ant’s request for remand for resentencing by a different judge] is that 
we have no way of knowing the effect, if any, the government’s mis-
conduct had on the sentence imposed by the district court.”206 The 
Fifth Circuit reiterated that although “the trial judge committed no 
error, . . . we have no alternative but to grant the relief requested by 
the defendant and remand the case to the district court for resentenc-
ing before a different district judge.”207 
The Eleventh Circuit has applied its Santobello jurisprudence in 
many cases involving prosecutorial breach of plea agreements over 
the years, ordering reassignment to a new judge on remand without 
                                                                                                             
 201 Id. at 1204. 
 202 Id. 
 203 See United States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1525 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 204 Id. Multiple defendants were involved, and there was some difference in 
the options each defendant had wished to pursue. See id. at 1521, 1525. 
 205 Id. at 1525 (citing United States v. Shanahan, 574 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th 
Cir. 1978); see United States v. Grandinetti, 564 F.2d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
 206 Shanahan, 574 F.2d at 1231. 
 207 Id. 
2018] REASSIGNING CASES ON REMAND 1121 
 
elaborating on the reasoning behind the reassignment.208 In Yesil, 
the court cited the Torkington test as the basis for determining 
“whether to reassign the case to a different judge on remand,” in-
cluding the factor of “whether the original judge would have diffi-
culty putting his previous views and findings aside.”209 In United 
States v. Taylor,210 the court exercised its judicial discretion to grant 
the defendant his choice of withdrawing his guilty plea, instead of 
specific performance of the plea agreement, in part on the grounds 
that “[e]ven if we were to remand this case to a different district 
court judge, [the prosecution’s] breaching statements would still be 
a part of the record available to the judge on remand and to parole 
boards in the future.”211 Other circuits, too, have dutifully followed 
the Supreme Court’s instructions in Santobello.212 
                                                                                                             
 208 E.g., United States v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 628, 631 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e 
conclude that Proctor’s sentence should be vacated and that he should be resen-
tenced by a different judge.”); United States v. Rewis, 969 F.2d 985, 989 (11th 
Cir. 1992) (“[W]e vacate Rewis’ sentence and remand this case for resentencing 
before a different district judge.”); United States v. Boatner, 966 F.2d 1575, 1580 
(11th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e vacate Boatner’s sentence and remand for resentencing 
before another judge.”); United States v. Tobon-Hernandez, 845 F.2d 277, 281 
(11th Cir. 1988) (“The sentences are vacated, and the case is remanded for resen-
tencing by another judge in compliance with the plea agreement.”). 
 209 United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1533 n.7 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 210 United States v. Taylor, 77 F.3d 368 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 211 Id. at 372. 
 212 See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 820 F.3d 678, 680 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(“[W]e vacate Warner’s sentence and remand for resentencing before a different 
district judge, as required by Santobello . . . .”); United States v. Whitney, 673 
F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 
(1971) (“[W]e must remand this matter to a different judge . . . .”); United States 
v. Diaz-Jimenez, 622 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. 
at 263) (“A breach is actionable, and a minimum remedy is specific performance 
and resentencing by a different judge.”); United States v. Cudjoe, 534 F.3d 1349, 
1356–57 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263) (“remand[ing] for 
resentencing by a different judge”); United States v. Mosley, 505 F.3d 804, 812 
(8th Cir. 2007) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263) (“[T]he case should be re-
manded to a different judge for resentencing.”); United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 
144, 155 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262) (“direct[ing] the case 
to a different judge”); United States v. Riggs, 287 F.3d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263) (“[R]esentencing ordinarily ought to be done 
by a different district judge.”); United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 
2002) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263) (“remand[ing] for resentencing before 
a different district court judge”); United States v. Hayes, 946 F.2d 230, 236 (3d 
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The Eleventh Circuit did attempt to further explain the rationale 
behind reassignment, in United States v. Foster.213 Although it rec-
ognized Santobello’s acknowledgment that “it makes no difference 
whether the judge was (or was not) influenced by information di-
vulged through the government’s breach,”214 the Eleventh Circuit 
stated that “the only available, sufficient remedy for the govern-
ment’s breach in this case is a sentencing determination by a judge 
who lacks knowledge of the information.”215 The court continued: 
“Since, as Judge Edenfield correctly admitted, he could not ‘uncon-
sider’ the information, we interpret the unique facts and record be-
fore us to contain a constructive request for recusal or sentencing by 
a judge who did not have knowledge of the tainted information.”216 
The court’s reassignment remedy has not been applied only in 
such unique cases, however. The court followed Foster in United 
States Madison,217 where the trial judge had “agreed to strike the 
Government’s filings [in breach of a proffer agreement] but declined 
to recuse herself, reasoning that she could disregard the inadvert-
ently disclosed information.”218 The court remanded the case for re-
sentencing “by a district judge who lacks knowledge of Madison’s 
post-conviction statements.”219 
As of the writing of this Article, the Eleventh Circuit’s most re-
cent application of Santobello’s reassignment remedy was in United 
States v. Hunter.220 In Hunter, the Eleventh Circuit held that the gov-
                                                                                                             
Cir. 1991) (“If specific performance is elected, Hayes must be resentenced by a 
different judge as dictated by the Supreme Court in Santobello . . . .”). 
 213 United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1056, 1056 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 214 Id. at 1056. 
 215 Id. at 1056 n.7. 
 216 Id. 
 217 United States v. Madison, 643 F. App’x 886, 888 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 218 Id. (citing Foster, 889 F.2d at 1056). 
 219 Id. 
 220 United States v. Hunter, 835 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2016). In the interest of 
full disclosure, I call to the reader’s attention that while I did not represent the 
government in the district court and neither wrote the appellate brief nor appeared 
at oral argument in this case, I did assist in the preparation of the government’s 
appellate case. As previously noted, the views expressed herein are my own and 
do not represent the United States Attorney’s Office or the Department of Justice. 
Moreover, I have no personal interest in the question of whether the original trial 
judge or a new judge hears any of the sorts of cases discussed in this Article on 
2018] REASSIGNING CASES ON REMAND 1123 
 
ernment breached a plea agreement by opposing an offense-level re-
duction it had agreed to support and rejected the government’s ar-
gument that no remand for specific performance was necessary be-
cause the trial court had awarded the reduction anyway.221 The court 
noted 
Hunter could not bargain for, and thus was never en-
titled to, the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction 
itself. Hunter bargained for the government to stand 
before the district court and affirmatively recom-
mend the reduction on his behalf. What Hunter re-
ceived instead was the government objecting to the 
reduction in the district court and arguing against the 
suggestion that Hunter was entitled to it.222 
That is, the defendant had not received the benefit of his bargain, 
even though he ultimately received the offense-level reduction he 
had hoped to obtain after receiving the benefit of the government’s 
performance of its plea agreement obligations. The specific perfor-
mance that could be ordered on remand was “the government’s rec-
ommendation of the reduction on his behalf.”223 The court stated 
that reassigning the case to a new judge on remand was “not due to 
lack of trust in the original sentencing judge’s capacity for fairness, 
but to reestablish the trust between the defendant and the govern-
ment that is essential to the plea bargaining process.”224 
VIII. MEANWHILE, OTHER TRIAL JUDGES ARE TRUSTED TO 
DISREGARD IMPROPER FACTS OR ARGUMENTS 
The rationale for automatically reassigning a case to a new trial 
judge when a remand is required because the government has 
breached a plea agreement is that, although the trial judge him- or 
                                                                                                             
remand. My interest in the question of when, and for what reasons, cases are re-
assigned on remand is entirely academic as a practitioner and scholar of appellate 
law. 
 221 Id. at 1323–25, 1330. 
 222 Id. at 1330. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
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herself has done nothing wrong by merely having heard the prose-
cution’s improper argument or information, “we have no way of 
knowing the effect, if any, the government’s misconduct had on the 
sentence imposed by the district court.”225 In Yesil, the court sug-
gested a trial judge in such circumstances may “have difficulty put-
ting his previous views and findings aside.”226 Foster stated that “the 
only available, sufficient remedy . . . is a sentencing determination 
by a judge who lacks knowledge of the information.”227 The court 
noted that the trial judge “correctly admitted” that he would not be 
able to “unconsider” the information.228 
And yet, in other contexts, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized 
that “[a]ppellate courts routinely accept a trial judge’s assurances 
that, although he has seen evidence, he has not relied upon it.”229 For 
example, in Ford v. Strickland, Chief Judge Godbold recognized 
that, “in bench trials, judges routinely hear inadmissible evidence 
that they are presumed to ignore when making decisions.”230 In 
Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., the 
court acknowledged that “it is presumed that the district judge will 
rely only upon properly admitted and relevant evidence.”231 The 
court again recently, in Jemison v. Simmons, described the ability of 
a trial judge to “exclude from his mind improper inferences drawn 
from inadmissible evidence in reaching a decision.”232 In fact, in 
bench trials, the court considers it “relatively easy for the judge as 
                                                                                                             
 225 United States v. Shanahan, 574 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1978); see also 
United States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1525 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Shanahan, 
574 F.2d at 1231). 
 226 United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1533 n.7 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing 
Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). 
 227 United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1056 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 228 Id. 
 229 Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 821 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983) (Godbold, C.J., 
dissenting in part and specially concurring in part). 
 230 Id. (quoting Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981)). 
 231 Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 
1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 232 Jemison v. Simmons, 518 F. App’x 882, 888 n.6 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing 
Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 
1981)). 
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factfinder to sort out the hearsay evidence from the admissible evi-
dence before making a factual determination.”233 
Not only are trial judges usually given the benefit of the assump-
tion that they can disregard inadmissible evidence or improper ar-
guments, even lay jurors are assumed to be capable of doing so. The 
Eleventh Circuit recognizes that both “[t]he Supreme Court and this 
[c]ourt have often held that we must presume that juries follow their 
instructions to disregard specific remarks.”234 The presumption that 
juries will follow the trial judge’s instructions and disregard im-
proper material is “almost invariable” and will be “overcome only 
if there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable 
to follow the court’s instructions . . . and a strong likelihood that the 
effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.”235 
This presumption applies not only to inadmissible evidence236 and 
improper remarks by a prosecutor,237 but also to erroneous or im-
proper statements by the trial judge him- or herself.238 
Consider the Madison case, where the court reassigned the mat-
ter to a new judge on remand for resentencing, even though the orig-
inal trial judge had assured the parties that she could disregard in-
formation improperly disclosed by prosecutors in breach of a proffer 
agreement.239 If, during a bench trial, the prosecutor had proffered 
for admission a defendant’s statements the judge ultimately ruled 
were inadmissible, the appellate court would “accept a trial judge’s 
assurances that, although he has seen evidence, he has not relied 
                                                                                                             
 233 United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1501 (11th Cir. 
1992). 
 234 Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289, 1334 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 235 United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 938 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted). 
 236 See, e.g., United States v. Mock, 523 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(presuming the jury has followed the trial judge’s instruction to disregard inad-
missible information). 
 237 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(presuming the jury has followed the trial judge’s instruction to ignore improper 
remarks by the prosecutor). 
 238 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 846 (11th Cir. 2011) (pre-
suming the jury followed the trial judge’s instruction to disregard comments he 
made to counsel during trial); United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1321 
(11th Cir. 2008) (presuming the jury has followed the trial judge’s instruction to 
ignore an erroneous example offered by the judge in his closing instructions). 
 239 United States v. Madison, 643 F. App’x 886, 888 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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upon it.”240 Yet, as shown in Foster, the court’s reassignment juris-
prudence takes for granted that same trial judge would be incapable 
of “unconsidering” the defendant’s statements if proffered by the 
prosecution in breach of a plea agreement.241 
If the prosecutor had made an improper argument to the jury 
during closing, the Eleventh Circuit has stated it would presume, as 
part of its analysis of the improper argument’s “impact on the 
jury,”242 that the jury followed any curative instruction to disregard 
any improper statements.243 In Rewis, however, the court held that 
the government’s statements during sentencing noting the defend-
ant’s non-cooperation, in breach of its promise only to raise the facts 
of the defendant’s offense conduct, required resentencing before a 
different judge.244 In Hunter, the court explained that the breach did 
not depend on whether the judge relied on the improper argument, 
but on whether the prosecutor acted in accordance with the govern-
ment’s obligations in making (or not making) certain arguments.245 
The Eleventh Circuit explained in Hunter why the existence of 
reversible error from the government’s breach of the plea agreement 
does not depend on whether the trial judge’s sentencing decision 
was affected by the breach. Once the defendant is deprived of the 
government’s promised performance of its obligations under the 
agreement, “[a]ny actions by the district court thereafter are irrele-
vant to the breach and the remedy; the court can neither moot nor 
cure the government’s breach.”246 If the judge’s actions are irrele-
vant to the remedy, however, then the rationale for the reassignment 
                                                                                                             
 240 Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 821 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983) (Godbold, C.J., 
dissenting in part and specially concurring in part). 
 241 See United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1056 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 242 See United States v. Hernandez, 145 F.3d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 243 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2009); 
see also United States v. Samson, 540 F. App’x 927, 931 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that “any prejudice from the government’s remark was remedied by the court’s 
prompt instruction to disregard the isolated comment”). 
 244 United States v. Rewis, 969 F.2d 985, 988–89 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 245 See United States v. Hunter, 835 F.3d 1320, 1330 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hunter 
bargained for the government to stand before the district court and affirmatively 
recommend the reduction on his behalf.”). 
 246 Id. 
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remedy in breached plea agreement cases remains curiously unex-
plored, and seemingly at odds with the rationales underlying reas-
signment in other scenarios.247 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Reassigning cases to different trial judges is an appellate court-
created remedy, stemming from the appellate courts’ supervisory 
authority over the lower courts within their jurisdictions.248 The 
cited statutory basis for ordering “such further proceedings [in the 
lower courts] . . . as may be just under the circumstances” does not 
speak directly to the power to reassign a matter to a different trial 
judge.249 The power seems consistent, however, with the hierar-
chical nature of our appellate court system.250 If the appellate courts 
are to issue remand instructions to the trial courts, they must be able 
to ensure compliance with their orders and remove any real or ap-
parent obstacles to their implementation and be able to safeguard the 
interests of justice. These rationales, however, fit best within the 
context of real or perceived problems with the trial judges in ques-
tion. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s Torkington test and its consideration of 
the trial judge’s “difficulty putting his previous views and findings 
aside” and of “the appearance of justice” seem to have little bearing 
on cases involving no bias, appearance of bias, obstinance, or mis-
conduct by trial judges.251 In adhering to the rule requiring auto-
matic reassignment in cases involving the prosecution’s breach of 
plea agreements, the Eleventh Circuit is itself complying with the 
                                                                                                             
 247 See generally Heytens, supra note 5, at 47–49 (noting that “[s]omething 
strange is going on” in cases premising reassignment on the assumption that “it 
would be unreasonable or unrealistic to expect a trial court judge to disregard 
certain evidence or arguments” when “all sorts of features of our legal system are 
premised on the assumption that judges are capable of doing these things”). 
 248 Clark III, 990 F.2d 1217, 1229 (11th Cir. 1993); Torkington II, 874 F.2d 
1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); see Heytens, supra note 5, at 34–36 
(discussing “appellate control” over trial courts). 
 249 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2012). 
 250 See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV. L.J. 515, 546, 
546 n.145 (2016) (citing articles exploring the hierarchical structure of the Amer-
ican appellate court system). 
 251 Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447. 
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Supreme Court’s holding in Santobello.252 The Supreme Court, 
however, offered no rationale for the requirement of reassignment 
in such cases.253 
Justice Thurgood Marshall subsequently described Santobello 
as an example of a case where, “notwithstanding the faith typically 
placed in trial judges to act impartially, fairness may require that 
resentencing be entrusted to a different judge.”254 Justice Marshall, 
however, was dissenting from the Supreme Court’s denial of certio-
rari in a case in which a death sentence had been re-imposed by the 
same judge who had based his original sentencing decision on infor-
mation not properly disclosed to the defense.255 The Florida Su-
preme Court had rejected the prisoner’s argument that resentencing 
by the same judge was insufficient to cure the error of his having 
originally imposed sentence based on improper information.256 The 
Florida court noted that “[o]ur judicial system is dependent upon the 
ability of trial judges to disregard improper information and to ad-
here to the requirements of the law in deciding a case or in imposing 
a sentence.”257 The United States Supreme Court let the Florida de-
cision stand and has not revisited or further explained the rationale 
for the reassignment remedy it set forth in Santobello.258 
“[R]eassignment is neither a new nor an isolated phenomenon,” 
and while there are certainly insights to be gained by “further inves-
tigation of the tension between the ideal of impartial judging and the 
reality of a sometimes all-too-human judiciary,”259 the practice itself 
naturally follows from the appellate courts’ supervisory authority 
                                                                                                             
 252 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971). 
 253 See id. 
 254 Harvard v. Florida, 459 U.S. 1128, 1135 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 255 See id. at 1128–31. 
 256 See Harvard v. State, 414 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1128 (1983). 
 257 Id. 
 258 In Puckett v. United States, the Supreme Court limited Santobello to cases 
where the defendant lodges a timely objection to the prosecution’s breach and 
held that cases where the error was not preserved would be subject to plain error 
analysis. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134–35 (2009). Puckett did not 
re-explore Santobello’s reassignment remedy. See id. at 140 (noting that a timely 
objection would allow the district court to “grant an immediate remedy (e.g., with-
drawal of the plea or resentencing before a different judge) and thus avoid the 
delay and expense of a full appeal”). 
 259 Heytens, supra note 5, at 54–55. 
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over the courts under their hierarchical control. Perhaps, like the 
Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit may wish to consider formal-
izing its reassignment practices and criteria by local rule.260 Even 
without codification by rule, however, the Eleventh Circuit, the dis-
trict courts within the circuit, and practitioners and parties alike 
would benefit from a clearer understanding of the circumstances that 
give rise to reassignment orders in the Eleventh Circuit. 
 
                                                                                                             
 260 See id. at 11. 
